BB84-based quantum key distribution system is limited in high speed and chip integration due to the requirement of four states preparation and measurement. Recently, the simplified BB84 protocol with only three states preparation and measurement has showed the approximate secret key rate with standard BB84. However, the security proof is only valid under the collective attack and requires the basis-independent detection efficiency condition. Here, we provide a security proof against the coherent attack, which simultaneously removes the basis-independent detection efficiency condition. Importantly, the phase error rate formula is quite simple through a subtle observation. We expect that the simplified BB84 protocol with decoy-state method can be widely implemented in reality.
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Quantum key distribution (QKD) can promise two remote users to share unconditionally secure secret key, which is expected to replace the public key distribution system against quantum computing attacks. Since the first QKD protocol, called BB84, was presented by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [1] , dozens of QKD protocols have been proposed and quite a few have been proven to be secure against the coherent attack [2] . However, there is no doubt that the most practical one is still the BB84 protocol. With the help of decoy-state method [3, 4] to circumvent the photon number splitting attack, BB84based QKD system can provide provable security under realistic conditions by utilizing the most mature commercial technology. The standard BB84 protocol has been employed to realize some commercial products and even demonstrated in satellite-relayed intercontinental quantum network [5] .
An important point in the BB84 protocol is that the sender, Alice, will prepare four states, i.e., |0 , |1 , |+ and |− , while the receiver, Bob, will measure the four states. Here, states |0 and |1 (|± = (|0 ± |1 )/ √ 2) are the eigenstates of the Pauli Z (X) operator. Although the technique of BB84-based QKD system is very mature, it still faces some challenges in large-scale applications. On the one hand, accurately preparing the four states is usually complicated and difficult in high speed and chip integration, such as the π phase modulation [6] . On the other hand, for detection, active choice of basis requires an extra modulator which will introduce additional insertion loss and increase the complexity and difficulty in terms of high speed and chip integration. Alternatively, one usually chooses passive basis choice with four detectors to implement measurement if there is no temporal multiplexing. However, more single-photon detectors will bring more cost and more complex calibration. In order to simplify the complexity of the experiment, a three-state protocol with three states preparation and four states measurement was proposed [7] [8] [9] as early as in 2000, which has first been proved unconditionally secure by introducing high phase error rate [10] . Afterwards, the secret key rate of three-state protocol is improved to be the same as the standard BB84 protocol in the asymptotic limit [11] . The three-state protocol has been implemented in field with approximate GHz system based on the photonic integrated circuit [12] . Recently, a so-called simplified BB84 protocol with only three states preparation and measurement has been presented [13] , which further simplifies the experimental difficulty, resulting a breakthrough in transmission distance from traditional 200 kilometers [14] to a record of 421 kilometers [15] for point-to-point QKD. However, both three-state and simplified BB84 protocols require the basis-independent detection efficiency condition and complex phase error rate formula. The basis-independent detection efficiency condition cannot be satisfied usually in the case of passive basis choice, such as the extra 3 dB loss of optical pulse interference in time-phase encoding system [15] . The complex phase error rate formula severely affects the extractable secret key rate in the case of large attenuation in finite-key regime. Furthermore, the security proof of the simplified BB84 protocol is only valid under the collective attack [16] . Here, we provide a simple security proof of three-state and simplified BB84 protocols against the coherent attack, which does not require the basis-independent detection efficiency condition and has a simple phase error rate formula.
Here, we first briefly review the entanglement distillation protocol (EDP) of bipartite qubit systems and its relation with the security proof of QKD [17, 18] . Then, we will provide the phase error rate formula for the BB84type protocol through a subtle observation.
Alice and Bob can acquire l bit unconditionally secure secret key [17] with negligible failure probability if they share quantum state nearly close to the perfect Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pairs |EPR ⊗l . The EDP has been proposed to distill almost perfect EPR pairs from the noise EPR pairs by using the local operations and classical communication [19] . We need to suppose that the gigantic state shared by Alice and Bob is in arbitrary form due to Eve's coherent attack. It is shown that the EDP performance and error syndrome of arbitrary-form state is equal to the Bell-diagonal state in the asymptotic limit [17] , which successfully reduces the coherent attack to the collective attack. For the collective attack, one can assume that the gigantic state shared by Alice and Bob can be represented as a classical mixture of the Bell state products, i.e., Bell-diagonal state. Let us define the four Bell states as follows,
(1) Thereby, the density matrix of the gigantic state shared by Alice and Bob can be reduced to ρ =
Let |ψ 1 be the reference state and Z basis be the reference basis, the parameters λ 2 , λ 3 , λ 4 are the probabilities of only phase shift error, only bit flip error, both bit flip and phase shift errors, respectively. One can always employ EDP to distill entanglement from the Bell-diagonal state [19] .
It has been shown that any EDP with only one-way classical communications can be converted into a quantum error-correcting code [19] . A special quantum errorcorrecting code, called CSS code [20, 21] , has a nice property that the phase and bit error correction procedures can be totally decoupled from each other. Therefore, one-way EDP can be securely reduced to a prepare-andmeasure QKD protocol by using the CSS code [18] , where the bit error correction can be implemented by classical error correction while the phase error correction can be replaced by privacy amplification. The requirement of CSS code can be removed by using the complementarity argument [22] . Besides, the EDP with two-way classical communications [23] and a universal approach of decoupling privacy amplification and error correction [24] have been introduced to prove the security of QKD. The secret key rate of BB84 protocol [17, 18, 22] in the asymptotic limit is r = 1 − h(e b ) − h(e p ), which makes us to focus on finding bit and phase error rates. Let
be the Shannon entropy, e b = λ 3 + λ 4 and e p = λ 2 + λ 4 be the bit and phase error rates. Here, one should assume no mutual information between bit and phase errors as the worst-case scenario for BB84 protocol [25] .
For a certain QKD protocol, the key point is to obtain the phase error rate. For the standard BB84 protocol with refined data analysis [26] , the bit and phase error rates can be given by e b = Y0,1+Y1,0 Y0,0+Y1,1+Y0,1+Y1,0 and e p = Y+,−+Y−,+ Y+,++Y−,−+Y+,−+Y−,+ , where Y a,b is the probability that Alice sends state a and Bob receives state b. We recall that the definition of phase error rate is the observed error rate when Alice and Bob hypothetically measure quantum states using the X basis, while those states are actually measured in the Z basis. According to the above security arguments [17, 18, 22] , one can securely assume that the gigantic state shared by Alice and Bob is the Bell-diagonal state. Note that each Bell state is a superposition state of two joint quantum states with the same amplitude, such as |ψ 1 , which is a superposition state of |+ a |+ b and |− a |− b in the X basis representation. The phase error rate e p = λ 2 + λ 4 is only related to the probability λ i of each Bell state. Therefore, we can obtain the new phase error rate formula e p = Y+,− Y+,++Y+,− , which means that the state |− a prepared by Alice is redundant. Similarly, the phase error rate can also be written as e p = Y−,+ Y+,++Y−,+ , which means that the state |− b measured by Bob is redundant. Note that |0 a 0| + |1 a 1| ≡ |+ a +| + |− a −|, we have e p = Y+,− Y0,−+Y1,− , which means that both the state |− a prepared by Alice and state |+ b measured by Bob are redundant. We have the following conclusion with the single-photon source for BB84-type protocol.
Three-state protocol. Alice randomly chooses Z and X basis with probabilities p and 1 − p. She uniformly and randomly prepares states |0 and |1 if choosing Z basis. She always prepares state |+ if choosing X basis. Bob randomly chooses Z and X basis with probabilities q and 1 − q. He measures states |0 and |1 (|+ and |− ) if choosing Z (X) basis. The bit and phase error rates can be given by
where E Z and E X are the bit error rates of Z and X basis.
The variant of three-state protocol. Alice randomly chooses Z and X basis with probabilities p and 1 − p. She uniformly and randomly prepares states |0 and |1 (|+ and |− ) if choosing Z (X) basis. Bob randomly chooses Z and X basis with probabilities q and 1 − q. He measures states |0 and |1 if choosing Z basis. He only measures state |+ if choosing X basis. The bit and phase error rates can be given by
Simplified BB84 protocol. Alice randomly chooses Z and X basis with probabilities p and 1−p. She uniformly and randomly prepares states |0 and |1 if choosing Z basis. She always prepares state |+ if choosing X basis. Bob randomly chooses Z and X basis with probabilities q and 1 − q. He measures states |0 and |1 if choosing Z basis. He only measures state |− if choosing X basis. The bit and phase error rates can be given by
where Y XX (Y ZX ) is the yield given that Alice chooses X (Z) basis and Bob chooses X basis. The intuition behind the security of the above BB84-type protocol can be understood for the basisindependent, i.e., |0 a 0| + |1 a 1| ≡ |+ a +| + |− a −|. For the BB84-type protocol, Alice at least sends three kinds of qubit state (linearly dependent) to prevent the unambiguous state discrimination attack. The basis information can be announced only in the classical postprocessing. Therefore, Eve cannot distinguish the actual protocol with three states sent by Alice and the fictitious protocol with four states sent by Alice in the quantum state transport stage. Different from previous works [11, 13] , we do not use the condition
Therefore, we do not use the basis-independent detection efficiency condition in above phase error rate calculation.
Nowadays, the phase-randomized coherent state is widely used to replace the unrealistic single-photon source. The phase-randomized coherent state can be regarded as a mixture of photon-number states with Poisson distribution. By employing the decoy-state method [3, 4] , one can efficiently estimate the contribution of single-photon component. Here, we only consider the case of simplified BB84 protocol, which is the simplest form of BB84-type protocol.
State preparation. Alice randomly prepares phaserandomized weak coherent state with intensities µ, ν, ω and 0, where the corresponding probabilities are p µ , p ν , p ω and p 0 . She uniformly and randomly prepares states |0 and |1 of Z basis if choosing intensities µ and ν. She only prepares state |+ of X basis if choosing intensity ω. The vacuum state does not have state information. Alice sends the optical pulses to Bob via an insecure quantum channel. Measurement. Bob utilizes the passive basis choice Z and X basis with probabilities q z and q x to measure the received quantum state. He measures states |0 and |1 if choosing Z basis. He only measures state |− if choosing X basis. Reconciliation. Alice and Bob announce the basis and intensity information through the authenticated classical channel. Parameter estimation. Alice and Bob employ the decoy-state method to estimate the yield of single-photon (vacuum) state and the phase error rate of single-photon state. Key distillation. Alice and Bob exploit the error correction and privacy amplification to distill secret key from the Z basis.
The secret key rate in the asymptotic limit can be given by (p µ ≈ 1 and q z ≈ 1) is the phase error rate of single-photon given that Alice and Bob choose Z basis, which can be given by φ zz
. The Y ab n is the yield of n photon state given that Alice chooses a basis and Bob chooses b basis. By using decoy-state method, the lower bound of yield Y zb 1 can be written as ]e −αηz /Q zz µ . We show the achievable secret key rate of simplified BB84 protocol in comparison to a standard BB84 in Fig. 1 . The red line and blue dashed line represent the simplified BB84 and standard BB84 with decoy-state based weak coherent state source. The black line and green dashed line represent the simplified BB84 and standard BB84 with single-photon source. Both the secret key rate and transmission distance of two protocols are almost the same even in the case of large attenuation.
In summary, we present a simple phase error rate formula of BB84-type protocol through a subtle observation, which provides the same key rate as the standard BB84 protocol under the coherent attack. Different from previous proof [11, 13] , our proof does not require the basisindependent detection efficiency condition, thus relaxes the experimental requirements. Our methodology can be directly applied to the loss-tolerant QKD protocol with imperfect source [11] , measurement-device-independent QKD [27] and prepare-and-measure protocol with high dimensional encoding [28] to simplify the experimental complexity.
